Talk about the historical significance and successful experience of the Zhangzhou Battle

Talk about the historical significance and successful experience of the Zhangzhou Battle

□ Dong Zhiming

Zhangzhou, once the second largest city in Fujian Province, has a long history and culture, which is a heroic. Zhangzhou, located in the rich area of ​​southern Fujian, is rich in supplies and commercial prosperity. In April 1932, Mao Zedong led the Central Red Army East Road Army. With the close cooperation and support of the people of the underground party and the people of the Soviet Union, he exceeded Zhangzhou in one fell swoop and inserted the revolutionary Red Flag to Zhishan for the first time. As an important offensive battle in the history of the people's army, the Red Army entered Zhang Zhang to reverse the passive situation of Wang Ming's military adventureism, consolidation and expanding the central Soviet region revolutionary base, enriching and developing Mao Zedong's strategic and tactical thoughts, promoting the party's fine style, and forming Zhou Mao Mao The military command mechanism of cooperation has played a positive historical role and accumulated successful experience. Under the new era, study the history of the Battle of Zhangzhou, the spirit of the Sixth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, summarize historical experience, learn and practice the strategic thinking and the spirit of the Red Army Revolutionary Revolution, and welcome the party. Twenty victories still have important practical significance.

I. disrupt the order of the reactionary rule of imperialism and the Kuomintang, reverse the passive situation caused by Wang Ming's military adventureism

The Zhangzhou Battle is an offensive battle that has been successfully implemented under the background of Wang Ming's "left" leaning line and fully implemented. In this context, the battle in most areas has been frustrated, the construction of the troops is harmful, and the combat and military construction has also been lost. The most typical case is the Ganzhou battle that just happened. This battle was very difficult. After a total of 33 days, not only did it fail to overcome Ganzhou, but more than 3,000 people in the Red Army were casualties. Among them, the cadres of 10 division were bravely sacrificed, and the morale of the troops was also greatly hit. Due to the use of Ganzhou's full strength, it lost the use of the opportunity to use the advantage of the people at that time, launching the masses, strengthening the Red Army, and consolidating and expanding the valuable time of the Soviet area. What is the opportunity? First, the Central Red Army achieved the third victory of the "encirclement and suppression"; the second was that the "September 18th" incident stirred up a new high of the national democratic movement; the third was that one of the Soviet Universities held and announced the establishment of the temporary central government of the Chinese Soviet Republic; Fourth, the KMT 26th Army held an uprising in Ningdu; the fifth was that the Jianghuai Basin developed a large water and added more than 100 million victims. These incidents made Chiang Kai -shek's internal diplomatic difficulties, which was really passive. In the case of scorching, he had to announce the "Xiaye" and moved the capital. It should be said that such a situation is beneficial to the Chinese revolution. At least the Red Army can "rest and supplement, relieve fatigue" as Mao Zedong described, and then "go to the soil fence" calmly. " First open the two Soviet areas of Jiangnan and western Fujian, and then open the two Soviet areas of Jiangnan and northeast of Gan. However, the temporary central government did not listen to advice, and stupidly thought that as long as "occupying one or two important central cities", it can quickly reach a province first victory, which will have the battle to fight Ganzhou. Another thing that is not good for me to hit Ganzhou is to politically alleviate the contradiction between Guangdong warlord Chen Jitang and Chiang Kai -shek. The Red Army's offensive against Ganzhou was so fierce that caused extremely panic of the Guangdong Army and Chiang Kai -shek's troops. Both sides increased their troops to Jiangnan. Soon, there were as many as 10 divisions deployed on both sides of the Ganjiang River south of Yuan Shui. One brigade was quite enhanced before the battle of Ganzhou, which added many new difficulties to the later Red Army's anti -"encirclement" operation. The above situation shows that before the Battle of Zhangzhou started, our party and our army were in a very passive situation in terms of politics and military.

The situation after the victory of Zhangzhou was completely different. This battle is very exciting, it can be said to be brilliant.据不完全统计，红军歼敌第49师大部，俘敌副旅长以下官兵1647人，缴获各种机枪2140挺，各种炮6门，子弹13万余发，炮弹4900发，飞机2架, Give Zhang Zhen's mortal blow, and achieved the purpose of eliminating the wing of the Cantonese army. Engels said: Revolution is a grand holiday for the oppressed. The news of the victory of the Zhangzhou campaign spread quickly. In order to make the Zhangzhou people truly understand the Red Army is a team of interests for poor people, in order to win the sincere support of the people, the East Road Army generally carried out serious policies and disciplinary education before entering the city. On the morning of April 20th, April 20th At 8 o'clock, a grand entry ceremony was held. After the Red Army settled in Zhangzhou, in view of the needs of the struggle at that time, Mao Zedong demanded that only grains were distributed in Zhangzhou, no regime was established, and temporary government agencies were established. During the Red Army's stay in Zhangfeng, they cooperated closely with local party organizations and guerrillas to mobilize the organizer to publicize the anti -Japanese claims, actively raise funds, expand their army, establish revolutionary regimes, develop local armed forces, open up the southern Fujian Soviet area, and complete the task of "down to Zhangzhou". On May 29, Fengzhong Revolutionary Military Commission instructed that the Red Army returned to the Soviet area in early June.

The party and the Soviet Union's military and civilians applauded, and the nerves of imperialism and the Kuomintang reactionaries will be tight. Zhangzhou is the city of Haikou, which has the characteristics of distribution of various information at home and abroad. Moreover, the forces of Japanese aggression at that time had affected Xiamen, which was close to Zhangzhou. The Red Army occupied Zhangzhou and implemented our party's anti -Japanese proposition with practical actions. It has had great political impact on domestic and foreign countries. Major newspapers in Shanghai, Hong Kong, Shantou and other places frequently reported the news of the Red Army entering Zhangzhang. The prestige of the Red Army was spreading, enough to make the "red" color change in the southeast coast. According to relevant information, after Zhangzhou was overcome, the Kuomintang's official officials were expensive, the gentry and rich, and escaped, and more than 100,000 people fled from Longyan and Zhangzhou to Xiamen. What's more important is that the Red Army has strived for military initiative, restrained the enemy who attacked the Soviet area, and reduced the pressure of the south of Jiangnan and the western Fujian. After laying off Zhangzhou, he forced the enemy of the western and western Jiangxi Fujian to immediately turn his attention to the Red Army stationed in the Zhang Red Army. The Kuomintang Central Committee urgently ordered Jiangxi Appeasement Director Zhu Shaoliang to "set up the troops to enter Fujian". The enemy forces of the Fujian and Guangdong were surrounded by Zhangzhou in three roads. About 3,000 people in Zhang Zhen attacked Zhangzhou from Xunan, and Chiang Kai -shek also caused the 19th Army to enter the Fujian to eliminate the Minh Red Army. Imperialism is also like an enemy and panic. More than 20 warships gathered in Xiamen Port quickly, and they are in emergency combat reserve. For a while, the order of imperialism and the reactionary rule of the Kuomintang was completely disrupted. 2. Consolidate and develop the central Soviet area base, and to break the preparation conditions for the fourth "encirclement" of the Kuomintang

One of the strategic purposes of the Zhangzhou Battle is to "consolidate", mainly to raise funds, consolidate the base of the Soviet area of ​​the western Fujian, and support the Red Army to fight against "encirclement and suppression".

The victory of the Zhangzhou battle directly promoted the consolidation and development of the western Fujian Soviet area. The 34th Division of the Red 12 Army was recovered with the cooperation of local armed forces. Longyan re -established the county revolutionary committee and gradually recovered the villages occupied by the enemy. The red area soon developed into 13 districts such as Hongfang, Dongxiao, Dazhongchi, Shanma, Tieshan. By June and July, there were eight counties including Yongding, Shanghang, Changting, Xinquan, Ninghua, Liancheng, Wuping, Longyan County, and Tingzhou City directly under the western and July district. In this way, the Fujian and Western Soviet Area has not only restored it, but also developed a large new area. At the same time, the local Red Army of the western Fujian also gained unprecedented growth. In addition to the original Red 12 Army and the 7th Division of the 7th Division, the Fujian Military Region successively established the 8th Division, 9th Division, and 10th Division. Later, after unified reorganization, the Red 19 Army was established. In addition, the county's Red Guards are compiled as independent regiments, and the military systems of the counties of the Soviet area are divided into three military divisions of Ningqing Gui, Yan Yonghang, and Tingwu Lian, which has formed the main red army and local armed people's armed systems that are closely cooperated with local armed forces. In the later anti -"encirclement", played a significant role.

The victory and expansion of the Zhangzhou Campaign have created a new situation in the southern Fujian workers and peasants. After the Red Army conquered Zhangzhou, it won the counties and towns such as Lianlongxi, Haicheng, Pinghe, Zhangpu, and Changtai. Later, actively assisted the local restoration and establishment of unions and farmers; mobilized the masses to fight local tyrants, divide fields, and grains; abolished harsh donations and miscellaneous taxes and usual loans; burned land deeds and debts; defeated the landlord's reactionary armed forces. During the Red Army in Zhang, the struggle for workers also developed new development. Workers in Zhangzhou and Shiqi have established the unemployed workers' committees to organize unemployed workers to conduct demonstrations; the party has established seven secrets of the Red Trade Union among workers. At the same time, the Minnan Party Organization has also been strengthened and enriched, and the new Zhangzhou Central County Party Committee was established. In order to protect the interests of the people of southern Fujian, with the help of the Red Army, the Minnan Industrial and Farming Revolution Committee and Zhangpu, Longxi County Industrial and Farmer Revolutionary Committee were also established. Mao Zedong also instructed the southern Fujian Party to pay attention to strategies on the issue of opening up the new zone, and did not fainted because of occupation of Zhangzhou. It stipulates "public publicity, secret organization", "only exudes grains without establishing regimes, and does not distinguish between land." Create the small Red Army, establish a small Soviet area "and other policies from actual departure. According to these instructions, with the help of the Red Army, the Minnan Party of China soon established the 3rd Regiment of the Chinese Workers and Peasants Red Army Minnan Independence and the 2nd Division of the Minnan Workers and Peasants Guerrillas, and gradually grew to grow into the mainstay of the revolutionary struggle of the southern Fujian.

The victory of the Zhangzhou Battle has strongly supported the construction and development of the Central Soviet Area and the Central Red Army. Before the battle of Zhangzhou, due to the Kuomintang's military "encirclement" and economic blockade, it caused great financial difficulties in the central Soviet area base. Many Red Army soldiers do not have military uniforms and military uniforms, and some necessary expenses for troops to fight, and even borrow money from the Chamber of Commerce. Salt, food, medicine, cloth and other daily necessities are even more lacking. After the victory of the Zhangzhou campaign, the Red Army raised more than 1 million yuan and was shipped back to the Central Soviet Area. A large number of urgent need for materials, which greatly alleviated the financial and material difficulties of the Central Soviet Area and the Central Red Army. help. After the Red Army returned to the Soviet Union, he also held a "Jinshan Yinshan" exhibition in Changting, and built a melting silver factory to re -melted the silver dollar raised in Zhangzhou into the Soviet area, which directly stabilized the Soviet area finance. The Red Army also transported a batch of books raised in Zhangzhou back to Ruijin and held a central library, which greatly enriched the cultural life of the military and civilians of the Soviet area base. In short, a large amount of funds and materials collected by the Zhangzhou campaign have laid an important material foundation for the comprehensive construction of the Soviet Area base. Third, boldly implement the offensive combat of the external speed decision, which enriches and develops Mao Zedong's strategic and tactical thoughts

Zhangzhou Battle changed the "defensive inside combat strategy" of the temporary central government for a long time, and adopted the "offensive outer combat strategy". The outer rays refer to the strategic surround of enemies, and the Red Army concentrated its strengths in the battle and battle, surrounded the enemy, forced the enemy to be in the inside and eliminated it. As a new combat style, the decision of the outer speed offensive comes from Mao Zedong's thoughtful and necessary reconnaissance during the guidance of the war, and the consistent thinking of various reconnaissance materials. Due to the powerful Kuomintang army and the weakness of the Red Army, the Chinese revolutionary war can only be strategically defensive and lasting, but in the battle battle, it is not the opposite of defense, lasting, but offensive and quick decisions. Under the conditions of the Kuomintang army's strategic offense, the Red Army is generally on the inside, that is, the strategic surrounds of the Kuomintang army. To become passive into active and achieve strategic counterattack or offensive, it is necessary to continue to mobilize and annihilate the enemy through a series of battles in the battle in a series of battles and battles. But this requires a favorable fighter. The opportunity finally appeared: from 1931 to 1932, after three anti -"encirclement" and Japan's attack in China, the Kuomintang began to attack the Red Army's defense. Mao Zedong keenly captured this subtle change, and decisively proposed a major suggestion to operate the Fujian, Zhejiang -Jiangxi -Guangzhou region with the "offensive outer combat strategy". After the practical test of the Zhangzhou battle, he further asserted: "After three wars, our military strategy should not adopt a defensive inside combat strategy on a large scale. On the contrary To capture the central city to achieve a province's victory, it seems to be based on the premise of eliminating the enemy. Under the current situation of the enemy and us, under the conditions of our army's support, all must be jumped out of the enemy's round enclosure, and the offensive outer combat must be taken to achieve the goal to achieve the goal to achieve the goal to achieve the goal to achieve the goal to achieve the goal to achieve the goal to achieve the goal to achieve the goal to achieve the goal to achieve the goal to achieve the goal to achieve the goal to achieve the goal to achieve the goal to achieve the goal to achieve the goal to achieve the goal to achieve the goal to achieve the goal. This is an important summary made by Mao Zedong under the new conditions. It is the further enrichment and development of the Red Army combat principle formed during the three anti -"encirclement" period.

As a successful battle for the Red Army's offensive operations, the plan of the Zhangzhou Battle fully demonstrated Mao Zedong's extraordinary courage and the outstanding talent of driving the war.

In terms of the choice of strategic policies, Mao Zedong proposed that the main force of the Red Army should adopt an external offensive operation to "attack and consolidate." In practice, this policy is realized through two steps. The first step was at the Jiangkou meeting, opposed to developing north along the sides of the Ganjiang River, seizing the central cities of the Ganjiang River Basin, and advocating to develop towards northeast Jiangu and northern Fujian, Zhejiang, southern Anhui, and southern Jiangsu. Essence This is because after the Battle of Ganzhou, the Kuomintang army was not ready for the new "encirclement" of the Central Soviet Area and continued to adopt the trend. At the same time, its troops are still relatively weak except for the enhancement of the Ganjiang River Basin. In the second step, before and after the China Revolutionary Military Commission's training order, the temporary central government turned around to the east and the soldiers. This is because the situation changes: Guangdong's enemy forces are approaching the border between Fujian and Guangdong, invading the western Fujian and Jiangnan. The Central Bureau of the Soviet Union and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission changed the plan according to Mao Zedong's suggestion to order the Central Road Army to change into the East Road Army. During a period of time in Fujian, the main task was to combat the enemy army of Fujian and invaded the western Guangdong army and consolidated the west of Fujian. And raise funds.

In the choice of the attack direction of the battle, Mao Zedong advocated that the Eastern Road Army was temporarily far away from the base area and took Zhangzhou and Quanzhou in southern Fujian. This is because after the army entered Fujian, Mao Zedong reconciled that only Zhang Zhen's 49th Division and a small number of local security forces were reconciled. In comparison, it was a weak enemy. In addition, the terrain and the masses are also beneficial to the Red Army. In order to make the central government's determination, Mao Zedong said: "Politically, we must go straight to Zhangquan to mobilize the enemy, seek war, and start the time. If you raise funds near Longyan, it is still a conservative situation. The following is difficult to do. "After the main force of the Red Army stayed away from the base area, the entire base may be occupied by the enemy. Mao Zedong emphasized that the Red Army occupied Zhangzhou and never stayed for a long time. It was just to mobilize the enemy of Guangdong to obtain fighters and collect military supplies to help local guerrilla war. He also understands that it is impossible for the Red Army to take long for a long time. The victory of the Zhangzhou Battle proved: "The operation of the East and West Army is completely correct. The East Road Army's in -depth Zhangzhou is definitely not mainly fundraising. Outside of the round surround, the two sides of the enemy's things were broken, so it was greatly threatened by our north and south sides, and had to transfer its target to the central region and move towards me. " In terms of choice, Mao Zedong and the Red Army adopted concentrated troops, sweeping the periphery, then taking the central government, and "showing the shape" to confuse the enemy, hit their unprepared, and quickly decide and summarize in a timely manner. Take Longyan battle as an example. The first is to gather for 1 day in the white sand. The second is that regardless of the enemy, concentrate his strength to attack Longyan. The third is the hidden camping in the large pond, avoiding Xiaochi with enemy defenders, and reaching an unprepared to hit the enemy. After Longyan's battle won, the Red 5 Army was ordered to rush to Longyan and the Red 1 Corps. In this way, before the Zhangzhou battle started, it achieved all the concentration of 20,000 troops in the East Road Army. At that time, there were only about 10,000 defenders in Zhangzhou. In addition, Mao Zedong also paid attention to mobilizing and relying on the people to play the great power of the people's war. Before playing Longyan and Zhangzhou, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai both attached great importance to launching the armed masses' attacks on the enemy, blocking the news, and stepping up martial law, so that the masses cooperated with the Red Army to do some "chaotic enemies and exploring their ears", so that the enemy could not detect the direction of the Red Army's action direction. Essence In order to ensure the victory of the battle, the people in the Soviet area supported the Red Army at the expense of clothing and shrinking food. After laying off Zhangzhou, in order to grab time to transport the materials to the Soviet area, the general public worked hard to overcome difficulties in the poor transportation conditions.

Fourth, promote the innovative spirit of pioneering and enterprising, adhere to the truth, the excellent style of seeking truth and being pragmatic, and democratic tolerance, and start to form a party military command mechanism for Zhou Mao cooperation

The Zhangzhou Campaign is the result of our party and our army in the passive situation of politics and military. It is also the result of the fierce debate of the leader of the Central Soviet Area with Mao Zedong's correct proposition with Mao Zedong. On the surface, it is arguing about the direction of the Red Army's action. The essential reflection is to attack the central city, or to attack the villages where the enemy ruled weak and take a roundabout road. This is undoubtedly the core issue of road theory and military development strategy related to the overall situation of the Chinese revolution. It requires extraordinary innovation spirit and the superb art to grasp the opportunity. Objectively speaking, Mao Zedong had considered clearly before the theory of the Chinese revolutionary road and its specific routes. The problem is that theoretical armed forces and theoretical innovation are not synchronized, even if they are in the party's senior management.

The Zhangzhou Battle is Mao Zedong's overall situation and setting point for observation and treatment of the Chinese revolution, and vigorously advocates the excellent style of pioneering and enterprising and adhering to the truth. Essence It is commendable that after the Jiangkou meeting, he did not have negatively, or swaying, and abandoning the party spirit in the case of his correct claims, or to abandon the principles and abandon the party spirit. On the one hand, using the stool of the army's operations to clarify their ideas in detail, and actively do the ideological work of hardships and meticulous persuasion. Hard work pays off. Through talkative dialogue, Mao Zedong did a good job in the ideological and political work of the party's decision -making level and the main commanders of the army, and finally obtained their understanding and support, promoting the transformation of decision -making towards the correct direction. Such a firm and clear party spirit principle, such a stubborn style of pioneering and aggressive and persistent truth, is crucial for the unity and unity of the party and the army, which is crucial to the victory of the party and the people.

The battle of Zhangzhou is the lofty style of Zhou Enlai's insistence on seeking truth and being pragmatic, democratic tolerance, taking care of the overall situation, and tolerance for the party's excellent style. One of the tasks of Zhou En came to the Central Soviet Area was to organize the Red Army to attack Ganzhou or Ji'an. But after arriving at the Central Soviet Area, he paid special attention to investigation and treated with different opinions. He had a long talk with Mao Zedong, thinking that his opinions did make sense, and quickly vocalized the temporary center. After receiving the recovery of Bogu's original proposal, he hosted a meeting of the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area for careful consideration, and discussed the issue of not playing Ganzhou. Mao Zedong still insisted on his opinions, but did not receive the support of most members of the Central Bureau. The decision to hit Ganzhou was made in this case. Is human thought correct or wrong and should be tested by social practice. The frustration of the Battle of Ganzhou proved Mao Zedong's outstanding military talents from the opposite side, and also opened the distance between Zhou Enlai and the temporary central government at the ideological cognition level. He once called the interim central government and made it clear that the attack center cities are difficult. This is inevitable to recruit the responsibility of the temporary center. In this way, as a Communist who organizes a strong discipline and regards the unity of the party as the party, Zhou Enlai will take care of the pressure from the "left" of the interim central government when decision -making in Zhangzhou. The voices of the commander of the Red Army's front -line troops; we must also respect and maintain the authority of the central government, strive to repair the cracks between the comrades of the temporary central government and Mao Zedong, and condense the power of the entire party, fully reflect the overall situation, tolerate the party, and at all hesitate The precious dedication of self -sacrificing self, truthfulness, pragmatism, democratic tolerance. The decision -making and implementation of the Zhangzhou battle began to form a military command mechanism of Zhou Mao's cooperation. According to Bogu's request, after Zhou En came to the Central Soviet Area, he should try to realize the work of Mao Zedong's specialized government, and do not ask the army's action. However, Zhou En came to the Soviet area to understand that directing the war was indeed Mao Zedong's excitement and strength. Therefore, from the fundamental interests of the Chinese Revolution, he not only did not perform the instructions of the interim central government, but also cut off Mao Zedong's military power, but also put forward suggestions for his military command talents as much as possible. In terms of actual operation, Zhou Enlai not only accepted the Zhangzhou campaign plan proposed by Mao Zedong, but also made a special trip from Ruijin to Changting to host a meeting to make specific deployments to support the East Expedition. After the meeting, Mao Zedong led the East Road Army expedition to Zhangzhou as the chairman of the temporary central government of the Chinese Soviet Republic; Zhou Enlai stayed in Changting himself, responsible for mobilizing military strength, coordinating the rear work, and ensuring all the needs of the front line. In fact, this has begun to form a military command mechanism with Zhou Mao. That is, Zhou Enlai is at the Military Command Center and is the highest decision maker of the Red Army; Mao Zedong is in the position of Zhou Enlai's main assistant to command the Red Army. He is the main planner and proposal of the Red Army strategy. Shortly after the Zhangzhou Battle, Zhou Enlai used the temporary central government to decide to restore the opportunity of the Red Army Headquarters. The leaders in front of them called the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area and proposed that Mao Zedong served as the General Political Commissar. In the telegram, he also suggested that the military, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, and the Central Bureau of the Central Committee also suggested that the combat command of the commander and the general political commissar, the combat plan and the decision to determine the China Revolutionary Military Commission. The right to decide is limited to the Military Commission. "Under the active fighting of Zhou Enlai, the temporary central government accepted this proposal. Taking this as a sign, Zhou Mao cooperated with the party's military command mechanism basically. Mao Zedong's command of the army was revoked in the first half of the year in Zhangzhou. In late November 1931, after the establishment of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, the temporary central government revoked the establishment of the Red Army. History and practice have repeatedly proved that the formation of Zhou Mao's cooperative party's military command mechanism and its later adjustments and improvement have played a vital role in the victory of the modern Chinese revolutionary war and the war of anti -aggression. (The author is a professor of the former military construction and military political work of the National Defense University)

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