[Bayi Special] From the Nanchang Uprising to Shanggangshan: Zhu De's exploration of the Chinese revolutionary road

From Nanchang Uprising to Shangjing Oka Mountain

Zhu De's exploration of China's revolutionary road

Flat

The Nanchang Uprising is the starting point for the Communist Party of China to create the People's Army. After the failure of the Nanchang Uprising Army south, as one of the main creators of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, Zhu De actively explored the revolutionary path suitable for China's national conditions in the great military practice of leading the Xiangnan Uprising in the great military practice of leading the Xiangnan Uprising during the hard work of leading the Xiangnan Uprising. The indelible contributions of the China Communist Party have composed the glorious chapter of the Chinese Communist Party's exploration of the road of the Chinese revolution, and became an outstanding representative of the Chinese Communists in the early days of the Land Revolutionary War.

1. "Leave a person": In order to explore the preservation and development of tens of thousands of people's army to explore the road preservation and development of tens of thousands of people

Without the people without the people, there is no basis for the Chinese armed revolution. The Chinese Communist Party explores the road of the Chinese revolution and must have an army of the people led independently. Zhu De's exploring the road of the Chinese revolution began with the important revolutionary fire species of preserving the rest of the Nanchang Uprising Army.

In the early morning of August 1, 1927, under the leadership of the former enemy committee of the Communist Party of China with Zhou Enlai as the secretary, He Long, Ye Ting, Zhu De, Liu Bocheng and other more than 20,000 troops under the leadership and influence of the party were launched in Nanchang. The first shot of armed resistance to the Kuomintang reactionaries. Since then, the Chinese Revolution has entered a new period of the Communist Party of China independently led the revolutionary war, the creation of the people's army and the armed regime.

Zhu De, who has outstanding military command talents, played an irreplaceable role in the brewing, preparation, launch of the Nanchang Uprising, and the uprising of the uprising, and successfully completed the arduous tasks assigned by the party.

In the military operations of the uprising army south to Guangdong, Zhu De first served as the commander -in -chief of the south to become a pioneer in opening the road. Then he commanded the third division of the Twenty Army and the Ninth Army Teaching Regiment to cooperate with other main forces to fight with the Kuomintang Army in Ruijin, Huichang, and defeated the Kuomintang Army. Two enemy divisions. ① He also commanded the 25th Division of the Eleventh Army and the Ninth Army Education Regiment for about 4,000 people in Sanheba to fight with about 20,000 enemies for three days and three nights to kill the enemy. After covering the main force into Chaoshan, Sanheba was withdrawn on October 6, 1927.

Zhu De's former site in the command office of Sanheba Battle

After the failure of the Nanchang Uprising Army south, in the case of losing contact with the Party Central Committee, Zhu De came out and took the initiative to take the initiative to hold the heavy responsibility of preserving and developing the revolutionary fire of the new people's army. At this time, Zhu De thought of: "As long as we stay a little, we will play a great role in the future revolution." ②

In response to the situation where the rest of the army's rest of the army and the departure of the officers and soldiers were very serious, from late October 1927 to early November, Zhu De carried out three rectifications in time, namely, Tianxinyu, Anyuan County, rectification, Da Yu rectification, and Chongyi County Shangbao's training. Essence These three rectifications, allocate some party members into various company teams, rely on their ideological and political work of their troops, conduct revolutionary belief education for the army, and strengthen the party's leadership of the army. Survival and development ability. This is the famous "Gannan Three Trels".

Zhu De was at the Tianxinli Army Conference

Although there are only seven or eight hundred people in the Nanchang Uprising Army, these people have undergone severe tests. They are the essence of the big waves and sand, and it is a revolutionary fire species of the immortal people's army. Zhu De led the army to launch a Hunan uprising in January 1928. After the Xiangnan Uprising, the remaining universal army of Nanchang developed to more than 2,000 people, and also formed three agricultural military divisions and two independent regiments.

In April 1928, Zhu De led the Nanchang Uprising Army and more than 10,000 people in the Xiangnan Farmers to withdraw from Hunan South Hunan, and transferred to the Qiu Harvest Uprising forces led by Jinggangshan and Mao Zedong. The two troops were compiled as the Fourth Army of the Workers and Peasants Revolutionary Army.根据1929年9月1日陈毅写给中共中央的报告，朱德和毛泽东会师后部队的组成情况是：“朱部二千余人，湘南农军八千余人，毛部千余人，袁、 Three hundred people each. "③

In June 1928, according to the instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Fourth Army of the Workers and Peasants Revolutionary Army was renamed the Fourth Army of the Red Army. "The combination of these two troops established the Fourth Army of the Red Army of the Chinese Workers and Peasants, becoming the backbone and core of the Red Army, thereby further developing the struggle of Jinggangshan and laid the foundation of the Chinese Red Army and the Chinese Armed Revolution." ④

History has fully proved that the remaining Nanchang uprising army preserved by Zhu De has become an indispensable and important armed force for the Chinese Communist Party to explore the road of the Chinese revolution. History tells us that with Zhu De's participation in the Nanchang Uprising, there is a revolutionary fire of Zhu De preserved and developing the Nanchang Uprising and the Hunan Uprising of his leadership. The birth of the "backbone and core" of the Chinese Workers and Peasants' Red Army, which laid the foundation for the revolutionary armed forces for the Chinese revolutionary roads that opened rural surrounding cities and armed regimes for the Communist Party of China.

2. "You can stand on your feet": Following Mao Zedong, the new people's army shifted from attacking big cities to entering the countryside

Zhu De's lesson for the failure of the Nanchang Uprising was in pain. Later, Zhu De recalled this history: The main lesson of the failure of the Nanchang Uprising was that the insurgents did not combine with the peasant movement of Jiangxi and went to Guangdong. If the contradictions between the warlords were able to use the conflict between the warlords, it was in Jiangxi. The farmers' movements are carried out in various places, solving land problems, establishing a revolutionary base, and renovating the uprising themselves. On the basis of learning the failure of the Nanchang Uprising, Zhu De began a new exploration of the Chinese revolutionary road. After Zhu De led the remaining army of Nanchang Uprising from Sanheba, due to the small number of people, the army was scattered, and the enemy forces rushed from all directions could be destroyed at any time. In this case, Zhu De first thought that he must try to throw away the enemy's heavy soldiers and get rid of the dangerous situation in order to obtain the survival of the surplus. So, where should I go to survive? Zhu De, who has a deep strategic vision, has deeply recognized that "our army should go to the countryside and not go to big cities" on the basis of seriously summing up the failure lessons of the Nanchang Uprising. " He has become a bamboo in the future of the troops in the future.

In order to uniform understanding, on October 1, 1927, Zhu De held more than 20 meetings at the Quande School of Rao Ping Maozhi, Guangdong. Some participants recalled that at this meeting, after heated discussions, Zhu De absorbed everyone's opinions and put forward his own proposal. He pointed out: "We want to preserve this army. As the seeds of revolution, we must find a foothold that is both hidden and a mass foundation." He further analyzed: " Three no matter the area, the farmers' movement in this area is early, and the support of the Northern Expedition is the most powerful. We should use this as a foothold. "⑦

According to Zhu De's proposition, the meeting made the army hidden north, went through Shanxi, went straight to the south of Hunan, and found a decision to find a foothold in the border area of ​​Hunan, Guangdong and Jiangxi. This decision was after Mao Zedong made a decision to lead the autumn and righteous troops at the meeting of the former enemy committee of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee of the CPC Hunan Provincial Party Committee at the Liren School of the Liren School of the Liren School of the Lili School of the CPC Mountains, Another important sign that shifted from attacking big cities to entering the countryside. The two decisions made almost in the same period of the same period represent the correct direction of the Chinese Communists to explore the road of the Chinese revolution and have far -reaching historical significance.

After the Maozhi meeting, Zhu De led the troops to carry out "three southern Gannan", and the officers and soldiers looked refreshing. In early November 1927, in accordance with the established plan, the troops left the Great Yu County and entered the Gao, Wenying, and Guting area southwest of Chongyi County, the junction of the three provinces of Hunan, Guangdong and Jiangxi. The area is Zhu De's ideal foothold. This is because during the Great Revolution, the farmers' movements in this area were rising, the revolutionary influenced, and the masses had a good foundation. The warlords were involved in this war. Therefore, Zhu De seized a favorable opportunity and commanded the troops to conduct guerrilla wars in this area. Su Yu once recalled: "Our troops began to explore the new revolutionary path." "Before that, our troops only knew the war, and now we have worked for the masses. This is a big progress. The time for the Chongyi area is not long, about twenty days, the significance is significant. For the first time, we combined the armed struggle with the peasant movement, although this is still a preliminary attempt. "⑧

Third, "guerrilla war is the main form": explores the guerrilla war tactics suitable for the Chinese revolutionary road with Mao Zedong

While led the Nanchang Uprising Army to find a foothold where the enemy's weak troops were found, Zhu De also seriously explored the guerrilla war tactics suitable for the Chinese revolutionary road. He carefully guided the troops to implement a major change in combat form, that is, from the regular battles of the original big city to the rural guerrilla war in rural areas with weak enemies.

In November 1927, after Zhu De's leading troops entered Shangbao, Wenying, and Guting area southwest of Chongyi County, they began to think deeply about the strategic issue of changing from regular battles to guerrilla warfare. Here, he analyzed the actual situation of the Chinese revolution. He believed that "the enemy is strong" now. The Communist Party of China has started to engage in his own armed forces since the failure of the Great Revolution. Win, to win more, we must pay attention to new tactics according to our conditions. "问题 The so -called "new tactical issue" is to change from fighting big fights, fighting formal battles, to fighting for small battles, and guerrilla warfare.战 Zhu De also made a scientific judgment of the "peasant guerrilla war" (11) in the future revolutionary war with his strategic vision.

In early December 1927, Zhu Defeng's instructions instructed the Central Committee to lead the troops south to participate in the Guangzhou Uprising. On December 19, when the troops arrived in Shaoguan, they met more than 200 people who withdrew from the Guangzhou Uprising after failing. After incorporating these more than 200 people into the troops, Zhu De transferred to the plow shop in the northwest of Shaoguan. Here, he carried out rest and training, and specifically guided the troops to learn the skills of guerrilla warfare. Based on his military theory and practical experience, Zhu De personally wrote two types of textbooks: infantry exercise and service in the formation. The textbook stipulates that the old -style dredging team is changed to the dredging formation of the sub -equipment to form a cross -fire net that is in front of the formation, so as to form a condition with less wins in combat, reducing the dense team in the enemy movement in the enemy movement movement. Dynamic by the enemy's firepower. The textbook also proposed the principles of combat principles such as "strong enemies' offensive offensive", "me to capture the enemy's weakness", "lonely enemies to be siege," and "often sending elite soldiers to harass the enemy". (12) After the textbook is edited, the teaching team is trained as the pilot. These textbooks were also important materials for tactical tactical education until Later Okinawa. (13) During the training, Zhu De divided the team into two companies, conducting counterattack exercises, and often came to the scene to conduct instructions, explained themselves, and demonstrated them himself. Do not shoot, can't hit or shoot. At the same time, Zhu De also asked the commander to know and know the other in the battle, and attach importance to the search and reconnaissance of the enemy. It is necessary to follow our conditions "" Can't fight hard with the enemy, we must look at the weakness of the enemy. We must pay attention to avoiding guerrilla tactics of reality. " (14) From then on, the troops began to change from regular battles to guerrilla warfare. They no longer fought hard battles. Instead, they began to fight guerrillas. A few days. At that time, in the case of the Party Central Committee attaching importance to the regular battle of the city, Zhu De's guidance forces have changed from a regular battle to guerrilla warfare, which is not easy. As Zhu De said: "At that time, soldiers wanted to fight big cities at the time, thinking that it would not be possible to be socialism and Soviet. It can be seen that it is not easy to change from a regular battle to a guerrilla war." (15)

The reason why Zhu De was able to dare to think and explore in this transformation of this major strategic significance, mainly because he can seriously learn the lessons of the failure of Nanchang Uprising. As early as in late October 1927, at all the staff conferences held by Tianxinyu, Zhu De emphasized that: The Nanchang Uprising "The past is not done, we are now" extending exhibitions' to do it "(16). Why do you say that? Later, when Zhu De recalled this history, he talked about the problem of the Party Central Committee at that time on the guidance policy. The experience of war has no experience of guerrilla war. " He also talked about the significance of guiding the "extension and exhibition" of the Nanchang Uprising Army to fight guerrilla warfare: "We retired from Fujian to Jiangxi, began to be forced to go up the mountain, and was forced to carry out guerrilla warfare. This has a benefit. The right direction -the direction of guerrilla war. "Therefore," tactics have also changed, and they will fight if they have a confidence. Can exist and develop. " (18)

The reason why Zhu De dared to think and explore in this transformation of this major strategic -significant combat form, and because he was good at using guerrilla tactics in the early years in Sichuan, Yunnan and the Beiyang warlords, he accumulated rich experience. As he said: "I still have some experience in guerrilla warfare. In the past, since the 1911 Revolution of 1911, I have fought in Sichuan and Yunnan warlords. The main experience is to adopt the method of guerrilla warfare. "From October 1925 to February 1926, Zhu De received military training in the Soviet Union and pimple warfare in the Soviet Union. Let him have a mature idea of ​​how to fight the guerrilla war after returning home, that is, "if you win, go if you can't win," "Drag the team up the mountain if necessary." (19) Therefore, when the newly -born people's army chose a tactic suitable for the Chinese revolutionary road, Zhu De was familiar with how to guide the troops guerrilla warfare. As Zhu De said at all the staff members of the Tianxinyu Force: "I have the experience of winning the battle and the lesson of defeating the battle. Our small revolutionary force will not fight with the enemy in the future, but fights wisdom." Essence (20) Later, after Zhu De led the Xiangnan Uprising Forces to meet with Mao Zedong and Mao Zedong, he used his guerrilla warfare strategy to "start organized guerrilla war" in Jinggangshan. Zhu De said, "At this point, I played a leading role." (21)

While Zhu De led the Nanchang Uprising Army to start guerrilla warfare, in late December 1927, Mao Zedong summarized the experience and lessons of the Jinggangshan revolutionary struggle. Fighting, emphasizing that the Red Army must "fight" and fight. "Fighting the circle" is to avoid the real hit, and the enemy is here. First, he leads him to a few circles. After he dizzy turns to expose his weakness, he will be able to fight hard and fight well. Not only eliminate the enemy, but also seize weapons. Mao Zedong also summarized and said: If you make money, you will not do it. This is our tactics. (22) Obviously, during the same period, Zhu De and Mao Zedong took the lead in exploring and practicing guerrilla warfare suitable for the Chinese revolutionary road. In this great military exploration and practice, the correct direction of the Chinese revolutionary road was clearly seen, just like Zhu De recalled: "I went up the mountain for a month and felt that there was a way to go up the mountain." (23)

Fourth, "farmers have their fields, they are the masters": provide fresh experience for the combination of armed struggle with the land revolution

In the old China with the majority of the country's total population, the power of farmers is the main force of the Chinese revolution. In this sense, the Chinese revolutionary war is actually a farmer's war. Therefore, how to solve the problem of farmers has become the basic problem of the Chinese revolution. This is also the issue of the Chinese Communist Party in the process of exploring the road of the Chinese revolution. It must be solved from the theory and practice. In the process of leading the Xiangnan Uprising, Zhu De combined the armed struggle with the land revolution, successfully making the majority of farmers the main force of the South Hunan uprising.

During the period of "Gannan Three", Zhu De used the party's united front strategy to use the classmates of Fan Shisheng, the 16th Army commander of the National Revolutionary Army. Under the conditions, the Tongfan Shisheng Department established a united front to make the troops' bullets, being served, and medicine.

After the Nanchang Uprising, the "Gannan Three True" ensured the immortality of the uprising of the uprising fire

In early 1928, Zhu De led the department to leave Fan Shisheng, transferred to the south of Hunan, and launched the Xiangnan Uprising in Yizhang on January 12. Then, the rest of the Nanchang Uprising Army renamed the first division of the Workers and Peasants Revolutionary Army, and also recruited a group of workers who built the Guangdong -Han Dynasty railway to participate in the army. The team has grown to more than 2,000 people. In just more than 3 months, about 1 million people participated in the uprising, and the revolutionary storm spread throughout 20 counties. According to Xu Lin, the Xiangnan Special Committee of the Communist Youth League in June 1928, after reporting to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the Xiangnan Uprising led by Zhu De was "responding to the majority of farmers" and "Southern Hunan has been shaken throughout." (twenty four)

One of the important reasons for the reason why Zhu De's uprising can attract such a vast number of peasants to participate is that he firmly grasped the general direction of the combination of armed struggle and the land revolution, and carefully guided and promoted the land revolution with the armed struggle. Essence On the eve of the launch of the southern Hunan Uprising, in early January 1928, Zhu De led the Nanchang Uprising Army Yu to enter the Mangyao Cave in Yizhang County. When a joint meeting with the Yizhang County Party Committee of the Communist Party of China here, Zhu De clearly proposed the action guidelines and programs that need to closely combine the armed struggle with the land revolution. "Regime", we must "expand the revolutionary army, formally establish the Workers and Peasants Revolutionary Army, and develop local revolutionary armed forces", and stipulate that the political slogan of the land revolution is "Riot! Beat local tyrants, divide fields! Riot! Eliminate all feudal forces!" And so on Essence (25)

On the second day after the riots of Yizhang, Zhu De delivered a speech to 56,000 people from all walks of life from the county, farmers, business, learning, and military at the mass conference held on the county square. The leaders of the Communist Party helped the poor to fight the army in the world "and called on" Everyone acts on a revolution. Only by the workers and peasants, they only have the armed for their own arms, and they can completely fight the new and old warlords such as Chiang Kai -shek. 26)

With the advancement of the uprising, Zhu De has also successively guided and helped the counties of the uprising to formulate and promulgate the "Land Distribution Law", which clearly stipulates that the landlord class is confiscated; Farmers in the ground must be divided by the township and the average population; based on the original farming as the basis, take more supplements to protect the interests of the peasants and avoid the phenomenon of chaos that may occur in the distribution. This work is specific to the Soviet government, and the Land Commission is a legal executive agency.

The promulgation and implementation of the Land Distribution Law formed a vigorous land revolution in southern Hunan. Xu Lin's report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in the short term of the Xiangnan riots "allocate the land in the short term (the county Soviet government confiscated the land to the township Soviet government with local distribution, and all participating in agricultural labor all participated in agricultural labor There are points, and there are many land that the Soviet government under the jurisdiction of the Soviet government), and given a high evaluation of "the riots in the southern Hunan". The report talked about the huge role of allocating land in mobilizing farmers to participate in the revolution: "Before the land was not divided, farmers hid local tyrants and gentry, and farmers would not hide after allocating land." At this time, farmers generally believed that the Soviet government "" they were them. What your own government, do something casually, go to the Soviet government to solve it. " (27)

The successful practice of Zhu De's leadership that combines the combination of armed struggle with the land revolution, which fully illustrates that only by completely destroying the feudal land system through the armed struggle can we ensure the fundamental economic benefits of farmers, and to fully stimulate the enthusiasm of the majority of farmers to participate in the revolution, and then become the enthusiasm of the revolution and become the enthusiasm of the revolution and become the enthusiasm of the revolution and then become the enthusiasm of the revolution and then become the enthusiasm of the revolution and then become the enthusiasm of the revolution and then become the enthusiasm of the revolution and then become the enthusiasm of the revolution and then become the enthusiasm of the revolution and then become the enthusiasm of the revolution and then become the enthusiasm of the revolution and then become the enthusiasm of the revolution. The main forces of the Chinese revolution, the Chinese revolutionary roads surrounded by cities and armed regimes in rural areas, can there be a reliable guarantee of victory. In summary, as one of the main creators of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, Zhu De not only participated in the leadership of the Nanchang Uprising, played an irreplaceable role, but also actively explored the revolutionary path suitable for China's national conditions after the rebels failed south. Important ideas have accumulated some valuable experiences, and the great practice of exploring the Chinese revolutionary road with the Chinese Communists such as Mao Zedong in the same time.

(This article originally contained in "Party's Literature" No. 1, 2014)

Reference

① See Zhu De Self -Read, PLA Literature and Art Publishing House, 2003, p. 109.

② Su Yu, "The Sea of ​​Rapid Stream -Memories of Comrade Zhu De and Comrade Chen Yi", "People's Daily" December 1, 1978.

③ "Selected Military Essays of Chen Yi", PLA Press, 1996, p. 2.

④ "Zhu De Selected Works", People's Publishing House 1983, p. 357.

⑤ "Selected Works of Zhu De", pp. 393-394.

⑥ "Zhu De Selected Works", p. 125.

⑦ "An Important Military Decision Conference", "Rao Ping Party History Information", No. 1, 1982.

流 Su Yu, "Return to the Sea -Recall Comrade Zhu De and Comrade Chen Yi", "People's Daily" December 1, 1978.

朱 Li Qizhong, "Comrade Zhu De taught us to fight", edited "Nanchang Uprising Information" in the History History of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1979 edition of People's Publishing House, p. 400.

选 See Zhu De Selected Works, p. 394.

(11) Chen Yi, "About the Nanchang Uprising in Bayi", Nanchang Bayi Memorial Museum "Nanchang Uprising", the Communist Party History Data Press, 1987, p. 319.

(12) See the "Zhu De Nianpu" (New Edition), Central Literature Publishing House, 2006, p. 97.

(13) See Li Qizhong, "Comrade Zhu De taught us to fight", "Nanchang Uprising Information", pp. 399, 400, 397.

(14) Li Qizhong, "Comrade Zhu De taught us to fight", "Nanchang Uprising Information", pp. 399, 400, 397.

(15) Zhu De, "Minutes of the Speaking of the Law of the Political College of Political Science", "About the Nanchang Uprising, the Xiangnan Uprising and the Jinggangshan Master of the People's Political Academy," Literature and Research ", No. 6, 1986.

(16) Su Yu, "Return to the Sea -Recall Comrade Zhu De and Comrade Chen Yi", "People's Daily" December 1, 1978.

(17) Su Yu, "Return to the Sea -Recall Comrade Zhu De and Comrade Chen Yi", "People's Daily" December 1, 1978.

(18) "Selected Works of Zhu De", p. 125.

(19) "Selected Works of Zhu De", p. 126.

(20) Chen Zijian, "Removation of Nanchang Eight Together", "Nanchang Uprising", p. 285.

(21) "Selected Works of Zhu De", p. 126.

(22) See the "Mao Zedong Chronicle (1893-1949)" (revised book).

(23) Su Yu, "Return to the Sea -Recall Comrade Zhu De and Comrade Chen Yi", "People's Daily" December 1, 1978.

(24) The Party History of the Party History of the Communist Party of China, "Xiangnan Uprising in Yizhang", internal version of 1987, p. 54.

(25) "Xiangnan Uprising in Yizhang", pp. 103, 104.

(26) "Xiangnan Uprising in Yizhang", p. 29.

(27) "Xiangnan Uprising in Yizhang", p. 55.

Source: Party History and Literature Research Network of the Central Committee of the Communist Party

Author: Ping Ping (Ph.D. in History of Nankai University, researcher of the Party History and Literature Research Institute of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and Zhu De research expert, worked at the former Department of Military History of the Military Sciences of the Chinese People's Liberation Army for many years. , Devoted to studying Zhu De for more than 20 years, the results were very abundant)

Picture: Fang Zhi Sichuan

- END -