Hong Kong media: Why does George Kainan's containment strategy work?

The Hong Kong Asia Times Online August 27th article, original title: why Kaan's curbing strategy will not work for China at the end of the "root of the Soviet Union". George Kenan believes that from the perspective of US policy And increasing the risk of stress is controllable.

He said it was because the interests of the United States in the Soviet Union were "very small". The United States "there is no investment in investment, no actual trade losses, almost no citizen needs protection, and there are few cultural contacts to be maintained." For the above reasons, Kenan warned that the Soviet expansionism should be infringed on the interests of peace and stable order. Each key point is resolutely curbed. In addition, it must not allow important global industrial and military force centers to fall into the control of opponents.

Kenan's "very small" observation of the United States in the Soviet Union is almost similar to today's China. The US export support for mainland China has more than 1 million jobs. The United States directly invests over 100 billion U.S. dollars in China, and its annual bilateral trade volume exceeds US $ 500 billion. American investors hold more than $ 1 trillion in Chinese stocks. China will become the world's largest economy by 2030, and will have the largest domestic consumer market by 2040. By then, these interests will be magnified.

More importantly, the premise of Kenan's curbing strategy is that the United States maintains a global economic dominance and uses this rich resources and influence to promote collective action against Moscow. In contrast, the United States has never faced opponents like China in history. This will in turn test the core strategic claim that the United States has depends on survival as the rise of the great country in the early 20th century: the United States can start from the national strength to respond to its strategic challenges.

From the perspective of the United States' policies for China and the Performance's geographical political perspective, curbing is not a suitable choice. First of all, the strategic concept of the United States to deal with China's challenges must be based on reality and objectivity. For example, competition in the United States and China is the global contest of democracy and dictatorship, which not only deviates from the real task, but also affects the accurate grasp of reality. Secondly, the American strategic concept must be given an inherent restraint and restraint mechanism. Third, the competition in China's challenge will be mainly economy and technology, not military or ideology. Military competition is usually zero -sum, and economic exchanges are essentially positive. As the Chinese economy exceeds other countries, its domestic market's attractiveness will cause problems to the collective actions of the United States and Western countries.

In addition, China's huge market will determine Washington to act with caution when formulating a "decoupling" supply chain strategy. A economic security boundary that hinders allies and partners and Beijing's advanced technology exchange is likely to become a Magnoline defense line for the geopolitical economy in the 21st century. Finally, Beijing's concept of polar order is no stranger. However, from the perspective of geopolitical strategy, Washington will discover that it is very difficult for the formation and deepening of a bipolar alliance composed of allies and partners in the Indo -Pacific region. Establishing and consolidating strong centralized centralization in China has been the most reliable guarantee for East Asia peace, prosperity and stability for thousands of years, and regional countries will follow China's influence of radiation. (Author Surab Gutta, translated by Qiao Heng)

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