Every hot review | Standardous fund practitioners' performance assessment is conducive to the s

Recently, the China Securities Investment Fund Industry Association issued the "Guidelines for Performance Evaluation and Salary Management of Fund Management Company" (hereinafter referred to as "Guidelines"). The "Guidelines" clearly states that fund management companies should formulate a scientific salary system and assessment mechanism in accordance with the requirements of corporate governance and compliance management, reasonably determine the salary structure and level, standardize the salary payment behavior, and the performance assessment should be compliant with compliance and risk management. Waiting for the linked, strictly prohibit short -term assessment and over -inspiration, and establish a mechanism for the interest binding mechanism of fund practitioners and fund shareholders. Fund management companies shall adjust and improve existing performance assessment and salary management before December 20, 2022.

In recent years, my country's fund industry has continued to grow. As of the end of the first quarter of 2022, there were 138 fund management companies in my country, 14 other public fund managers, about 30,000 registered funds, and the scale of asset management exceeded 25 trillion yuan. The author believes that the release of the "Guidelines" is conducive to standardizing the salary payment behavior of the fund practitioners, preventing short -term incentives and excessive incentives, and at the same time, it is also conducive to promoting industry standardization.

According to the "Guidelines", the salary includes four parts: basic salary, performance compensation, benefits and subsidies, and medium- and long -term incentives. At the same time, four more important "mechanisms" are also stipulated:

Delay payment mechanism. Fund management companies shall establish a deferred payment system for performance salary. The deferred payment period is not less than 3 years. In principle, the delayed payment of key positions such as executives and fund managers in principle is not less than 40%.

Interest binding mechanism. Fund executives and fund managers should purchase a certain percentage of performance salary to purchase the company or the public fund managed by themselves. The purchase amount of executives should be no less than 20%of the performance salary of the year, and the fund manager should be not less than 30%.

Long -term performance assessment mechanism. The board of directors should evaluate the manager layer and other layers shall combine long -term investment performance, long -term investment income, compliance and risk management, and professional ethics level. Long -term investment performance refers to the investment income of the last 3 years or more.

Accountability pursuit mechanism. If the company is responsible for violations of laws and regulations or operating risks, the company may stop paying the paying part of the relevant responsible persons, and requires it to refund the relevant bonuses that year, or stop implementing long -term incentives.

The author believes that the "Guidelines" has a considerable role in improving the long -term incentive and restraint mechanism of the fund industry, realizing the consistency of the long -term interests of the fund manager and the long -term interest of the foundation. However, it should be soberly seen that it is difficult to solve the problem of unreasonable compensation such as fund managers such as "Guidelines".

First of all, the "Guideline" is more binding to pay for the "performance salary" part. Fund managers, etc. are used to purchase our funds, but only a small part of "performance compensation", and "performance compensation" is only part of the total salary. The role of interest binding cannot be highly estimated. The delayed payment of "performance compensation" is just to be transformed into zero -delay in several years, which will not affect the high annual salary of fund employees.

Secondly, the "Guidelines" difficult to change the interests of the fund company and the fund holder is inconsistent. This is mainly because the management fee of general public funds has nothing to do with the profit and loss of the fund, and it is still a model of drought and flood protection. General fund management fees are accounted for 1.5%of the annual rate of the fund asset value of the previous day. The daily calculations are required to be paid to the end of the month, and the monthly payment will be paid. Whether the foundation is profitable depends on the face of the market and eat by the sky.

Third, the accountability pursuit mechanism may be difficult to place. For example, the current model of public funds is relatively popular, and its stock price can rise for a few years. On the one hand, the investment in the group has not been identified as violations of laws and regulations. On the other hand, it is difficult to cover the long -term investment performance assessment mechanism for more than three years. Should I pursue a fund manager who follows up the group? In addition, individual public funds have frequently stepped on lightning, and few fund companies have reported on fund managers.

In the author's opinion, the key to standardize the salary and other salary of public fund managers is to consider the problem from the perspective of investors in the fund share. Fund managers, executives, and other millions of pays and tens of millions of salary each year are worthy of considering whether they are the dedication of the foundation.

The first is to establish a salary cap mechanism. Public funds to publicly raise funds from the public should have a certain public welfare, and should accept mainstream values ​​such as "common prosperity" in today's society. Common wealth is the common prosperity of all people. It is not the wealth of a few people. The difficulty is income distribution. Fund practitioners earn, the minimum earnings, or even a huge loss, this is not common. To this end, the top salary mechanism can be stipulated in industries such as securities funds. In addition to appropriate equity incentives, all cash income includes performance compensation, and a limited limit is clearly set.

The second is to improve the management fee of public funds. For example, it can be agreed that if the foundation is at a loss when it is redeemed, the fund company will return the previous management fee that it has collected appropriately until the capital is kept. In addition, a floating rate mode can also be adopted, which is a compromised charging model. In general, it is necessary to fundamentally suppress the annual high management fee income of public fundraising funds, and the management fee is less. The high salary of the fund practitioners can naturally get a salary solution at the bottom of the kettle.

The third is to guide public fund funds to operate more.At present, some group bubbles have begun to break, but the profit model of this snowball is simple and effective, and it may still bred new risks in the market.The regulatory authorities should introduce restrictions on the operation of the fund holding group, and the other suspected market manipulation and insider trading behavior must be filed for investigation and investigation;treatment.In short, the salary payment of the standard fund practitioners is properly at the same time. Through standardized fund management companies' performance assessment and salary management behavior, it improves the long -term incentive constraint mechanism, which is conducive to promoting the steady operation of fund management companies and the sustainable development of the entire industry.

(The author is financial reviewer)

Daily Economic News

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