Where is New Zealand's kiwi?

The New Zealand Qiji, which is ten dollars, has a twists and turns.

In 1903, the New Zealand ISABEL Fraser discovered a fruit tree full of kiwi in China and brought it back to New Zealand to plant. At the beginning, the New Zealanders called this fruit "Chinese Gooseberry" and brought to the US market after World War II, which is very popular.

But this group of New Zealanders found that because there is a Chinese in the name, it will make everyone think that this fruit is only authentic from Chinese. So New Zealand's fruit farmers were in pain, and found inspiration from the National Bird's Kiwi (Kiwi), renamed Chinese vinegar chestnuts "Kiwi Fruit", and became famous.

New Zealand National Bird Kiwi Kiwi, the origin of the name of Qi Gi Guo

In addition to the problem of hukou-hunting, another feature of New Zealand Qiqi is expensive. Take the minimum "classic fruit (88-102g)" of Zesprit as an example. Nearly ten yuan, the average of more than 15 "huge fruit (146-174g)".

In 2019, the "cherry free" was born, and everyone found that some people were bright on the surface, and in fact they couldn't even eat cherry. Then, various economic crops can hang up with class identity: such as 300 pounds of Qingwang grapes and thousands of black stab durian.

How does a high -end fruit that does not pit the poor appear?

01

Password: Become a brand

China's kiwi and China's semiconductor industry are very similar: looking at the Premier League, seeing ten profits.

The planting area of ​​Chinese kiwi is 13 times that of New Zealand, but in 2019, China's kiwi planting profit is about 3500-4000 yuan per acre. 10,000 yuan [12].

Jiapei entered the Chinese market for the first time in 1999, and the latter contributed only 2%of the income at that time. [7]. Today, China and Japan are the two largest markets in Jiapei, and their contributions have contributed nearly 50%.

From a commercial perspective, fresh products, including fruits, are not a particularly good business.

The consumer terminal from the fields to the city will go through four links: growers-buyer-wholesale market-supermarket/fruit shop, buyers often have several floors, generally the increase in the price of each link is 30%[2 ].

A watermelon was originally produced in the northwest 4 cents a pound, and it had to be added to four or five pounds to Shanghai. [3]. Although the overall price has increased a lot, there are many long links, and each participant is profitable or even small.

Xu Zheng, the founder of Youxian, once evaluated the fresh e -commerce industry in this way: picking up steel with his buttocks.

On the other hand, fruits are typical "categories and no brands". For example, only Red Fuji apples and have never heard an apple of a certain brand.

Compared with consumer goods, fruits are more like commodities, only the difference between "varieties", just like Guoguang, Golden Crown and Red Fuji in Apple, which determines its difference in production.

Both Nai Xue and Xisha tea make fruit tea. Some people think that the good taste of tea will pay the premium for Xicha. But if someone loves to eat Red Fuji, he will often choose the cheapest Red Fuji, instead of recognizing a certain brand.

There are no brands, naturally there is no premium brought by the brand. Moreover, fruits are a high -frequency consumption. Customers are extremely sensitive to prices and it is difficult to significantly increase prices.

For e -commerce platforms, agricultural products, including fruits, have a very distinctive feature: difficult to monetize. The so -called monetization (operating income/GMV) refers to removal of income obtained outside the product transaction. The most common method is advertising, promotion position, bidding ranking, and so on.

But if there is no brand, monetization is empty talk. 10 yuan a box of Apple's screen advertisement on the face of consumers, they will still go to the merchants who only sell 9.9.

This is why Pinduoduo is the lowest monetary rate in the e -commerce platform, because there are many white cards on Pinduoduo itself, and the development of agricultural products in recent years is difficult to monetize.

Therefore, the key step is to sell fruit at a high price. There are actually such cases in China -the same brand of rock sugar oranges, and the brand "Chu Orange" is sold to Beijing. But in the final analysis, it was Chu Shijian's own brand endorsement.

Looking at the high -profile fruit merchants such as Jiapei and Dole Food in New Zealand and the United States, the core is to successfully change the fruit from "category" to "brand". Their secrets are not complicated:

Since Orange Sheng Huainan is an orange, I have monopolized Huainan's oranges.

02

Path: bigger first, then stronger

A few years ago, Jiapei sued a Chinese named Gao Haoyu on the court because of infringement of his intellectual property rights.

According to media reports, in 2013, Gao Haoyu purchased a orchard in New Zealand and signed an agreement with Jiapei to grow Jiapei's fist products SUNGOLD (Sunshine Golden Fruit) kiwi. By 2016, Jiapei employees found that SUNGOLD was circulating to China and planted in some places in China.

The court's record showed that Jiapei once hired a private detective investigation and found that Gao Haoyu brought Sungold's seeds to China.

In the end, the New Zealand Court ruled that Gao Haoyu compensated Jiapei about 15 million New Zealand dollars. After Gao Haoyu appealed, the New Zealand Court of Appeal made a decision last year that the amount of compensation was reduced to about 12 million New Zealand, about 50 million yuan. The defendant Gao Haoyu in the case

Although Jiapei won the lawsuit, SUNGOLD's seeds have already taken root in China. According to Jiapei's survey, China has nearly 5,000 hectares of "counterfeit" SUNGOLD [8], and the number of "counterfeit" fruits is likely to surpass Jiapei's export to China in 2023.

This case caused a stir in the industry, once a shocking Ministry of Commerce of the two countries, and also explained how Jiapei turned fruits into a brand -first turning seeds into its own intellectual property rights, and then obtaining pricing power.

Observing the vast majority of "noble fruits", they will find that they are branded on the surface, and they are actually monopolies behind categories.

Hermes in the grape industry, the "Qing King", is a sunshine rose. It was introduced to China as early as 2015, and even the planting area and output have exceeded Japan.

Because the intellectual property rights did not do well during the research and development period, the seeds of sunlight roses were popular in South Korea. The price of grapes fell from 300 yuan per catty to 10 yuan, which once caused agricultural patent lawsuit between Japan and South Korea [11].

Last year, Japan's newly revised "Seedling Law" prohibited 1975 varieties, including "Sunshine Rose", in which the purpose was to make up for the dead sheep and monopolize varieties.

The turning point of Jiapei Kiwi appeared in 1997. The New Zealand government made up their minds to transform the kiwi industry from the farm-purchasing-sales chain to corporate operation, and concentrate its strength to create a brand.

The opportunity to transform was the anti -dumping penalty of kiwi in New Zealand in 1992. Prior to this, New Zealand's kiwi planting was empty and it was easy to fall into the internal competition between fruit farmers. In 1997, under the host of the New Zealand government, Jiapei became the only foreign exporter in the country.

In the upstream, in the 30 years of cooperation between Jiapei and PFR Food Technology Company, 50,000 potential new varieties were studied, and only 3 varieties were selected for commercialized experiments [7]. The SUNGOLD (GOLD3 and GOLD9) in the lawsuit are the breeds cultivated by Jiape own. It has golden flesh and stronger ability to resist insect disease.

A few years ago, Jiapei also successfully cultivated a kind of red pulp kiwi and entered the Chinese market last year. Jiapei's annual R & D investment exceeds 35 million New Zealand dollars (about 150 million yuan), of which 20 million New Zealand dollars are used for new varieties development. In addition to the taste, the direction of R & D also has stability, disease resistance, and storage resistance.

After the emergence of the new variety, Jiapei will turn it into a patented variety and make various kiwi an exclusive product. The same type of kiwi can only sell 6 yuan for kiwi authorized seedlings, but 10 yuan can be sold after authorization.

In the past fiscal year, Jiapei's profit after tax was 1.585 billion yuan.

03

Division: The defeat of the channel brand

Compared with New Zealand, China's planting industry is scattered, and "bigger" is often a pseudo -proposition. The brand -based attempts of domestic fruits are more representative of the "channel brand".

The most typical is Hong Jiuguo and Belong Garden, which are the fruits of the purchasing upstream growers. After posting the card, it is sold to the downstream. It's just that Baiguoyuan is a fruit store brand, facing franchisees; and Hongjiu distributor brand, facing wholesalers. In other words, they do not participate in upstream planting, but have branded the influence of channels.

The channel brand was once supported by the capital. Bailuo Garden financed for 8 rounds in 6 years, and there were more than 20 institutions behind them. Among them, there were many celebrities such as Tian Tu and CICC. Before Hong Jiu IPO, Alibaba was the largest external investment square.

The biggest difference between channel brands and origin brands is that there are often only a few categories in the latter, such as Jiapei only kiwi, and only avocado, banana, and cherry. The mature season and the area of ​​fruit are not consistent, and the difficulty of supply chain management can be called hell level.

Picture source: Iri Consultation

Apple and peaches are suitable for saving at 0 ° C, but the litchi is changed at 0 ° C, and the banana needs an environment above 12 ° C. Therefore, the operating ideas of most enterprises rely on scale advantages to participate in or hold the upstream supply chain of the shares or hold the upstream supply chain to compress the cost of the supply chain instead of seeking a brand premium.

Hong Jiu fruit, who had paid the table not long ago, turned five times the revenue from 2019 to 2021, but the cash flow pressure increased with the same day.

Picture source: referee document network

The biggest problem of channel brands is that there is no way to control the upstream. From the data point of view, Baiguoyuan and Hong Jiu have 80%-90%of sales costs, almost all of them are the cost of purchasing fruits. Once encountering extreme weather or diseased diseases, the quality and yield of fruits will be affected, which will affect the cost of procurement.

Therefore, even if a certain brand influence is formed, the channel brand does not have a premium, and their profit margin is only about 3%.

There is no company like Jiapei in my country. Although Korla Xiangli is one of the earliest fruits in China in China. In 2001, the parent company Xiangli shares was listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. However, in recent years The net profit of the home is negative.

Korla Xiangli is a typical monopoly origin business. Such origin brands are often operated by local governments and capital, but often there is an obvious problem: the main body is blurred, and the degree of marketization and operational level are not high. In the process of Jiapei from the big to strong, the New Zealand government played a pivotal role.

In the 1980s, the New Zealand government established an institution called the "New Zealand Strange Fruit Marketing Bureau". Its biggest role was to integrate the original scattered acquisition and export links to achieve a certain price and avoid vicious price war.

This institution was divided into two in the 1990s, and the institutions were "restructured" into enterprise units.

Among them, a brand marketing and product exports responsible for global, that is, Jiapei; a supply chain and breeding of upstream. In addition to the development of new varieties, Jiapei also has many innovations in the supply chain, such as the standardized subcontracting and traceability of kiwi.

You think this is a story of the planting industry. This is actually an export -oriented economic cooperation with industrial policy. Through the research and development breakthrough of high value -added links to achieve industrial upgrading.

Therefore, it is not only chip and lithography machine called hard technology.

Reference materials:

[1] Hong Kong people eat millions of kg of fruits every day, and the commercial economy Wenhui

[2] Behind the price of fruits "fly": the anxiety and helplessness of a fruit wholesaler, Zhejiang merchant magazine

[3] Buy one 100 yuan, why watermelon is getting more and more expensive, AI Finance Society

[4] 4 million bananas and a city: How does the banana business in New York work? Curiosity Daily

[5] Jiapei captured China's kiwi market and exposed a big problem, Shangyin Society

[6] "Hermes in the Grape World" Three Kingdoms Killing, Interface Finance Number

[7] How to sell a strange fruit to 10 yuan, Zespri Jiapei's century -old legendary story | Deep analysis of 10,000 characters, ATP convenience store

[8] New Zealand's Kiwifruit Heading Home to China, Reuters

[9] Cuttings of Prized SUNGOLD KIWIFRUITS WeRe Smuggled to China and NZ GROWERS Are Divided Over What to do About It, abc.auau

[10] After the "Sunshine Golden Fruit" is sold, Caixin

[11]韓国で日本の果物が無断栽培…日韓「農業戦争」が勃発していた，松岡久蔵

[12] my country's kiwi market and industrial survey analysis report, China Food Industry Association

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