Ding Dong buys vegetables to withdraw from many cities, fresh e -commerce companies are facing capital liquidity examinations

China Commercial Daily (Reporter He Yangwen/Figure) On June 15th, fresh e -commerce Ding Dong's buying dishes officially withdrawn from the Tianjin market. Since the end of May, Ding Dong has been withdrawn from multiple cities, including Guangdong Zhongshan, Zhuhai, Xuancheng, Luzhou, and Tangshan, Hebei.

Some opinions believe that there is a mistake in the early strategic layout of Ding Dong to buy vegetables, the regional profit is hopeless, and the pressure of losing money has to be defeated. In addition, after listing, the secondary market for Ding Dong's food -buying dishes has performed well, the stock price has fallen endlessly, the external blood transfusion is weak, and the cash flow of internal operations is difficult to support them to continue burning money subsidies.

Ding Dong Buy Cai Cai Beijing Area First Press Station Station

Within six cities within one month

Different from the past, the new city was opened and the new warehouse was opened, and Ding Dong's buying food began to reduce the business scale sharply. Recently, Ding Dong ’s buying APP issued an announcement saying that due to the company's routine optimization and adjustment of some areas and sites, the store where the Tianjin region is located at 18:00 on June 15, 2022, which is stopped at 18:00 on June 15, 2022. It is not used in coupons, balances, etc., and it is recommended to use it as soon as possible.

According to incomplete statistics, since the end of May, Ding Dong has successively dismissed business, including Guangdong Zhongshan, Zhuhai, Xuancheng, Luzhou, and Tangshan, Hebei.

At present, there are only 27 cities that show normally on the platform of Ding Dong, which is nearly 10 cities compared with its heyday, and the overall number has shrunk by nearly 1/4. The data shows that as of the end of December 2021, the sorting centers were set up in more than 60 cities across the country. The total number of front warehouses reached 1,400, and the total front warehouse area reached 500,000 square meters.

In response to the reasons for the recent withdrawal of the city, Ding Dong's buying staff told the China Commercial Daily reporter: "This time Tianjin, Anhui and other places involved in the number of front warehouses in total. The small adjustment scale does not affect the company's overall normal operation. "

Market analysis believes that Ding Dong's buying vegetables began to reduce the scale and cut off some low -line cities to better focus on Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shanghai, and focus on the first- and second -tier cities. The possibility. Compared to the horse race before listing, Ding Dong's need to make food now is "tightening pants belt" to prepare for winter.

"It is not difficult to see that the cities that Ding Dong bought vegetables have been withdrawn, and local residents purchase fresh consumer groups through the Internet, and the market size is limited. It is difficult to cultivate user consumption habits. What is the matter. Due to the pre -positioning model of Ding Dong ’s food and food, the platform's customer acquisition cost is huge in the early stage and requires continuous burning money subsidies. At the same time, in terms of the construction of the supply chain, the new city and the layout of new sites need to precipitate a lot of funds. The cost of performance delivery in the later period is also high. The great reason for withdrawal from these cities is that Ding Dong ’s buying food is under pressure, so he has to shut down." The reporter said in an interview.

Wen Zhihong believes that the removal of the city reflects the mistakes of Ding Dong's buying food in strategic layout, and the blind expansion has laid various hidden dangers into the later defeat. The profitability of the front warehouse fresh e -commerce pays attention to the scale effect, and the operating cost of diluted outlets must be achieved through large -scale development to achieve profitability. In contrast, some cities where Ding Dong bought vegetables is difficult to see profit expectations after a period of operation. If you do it, it is continuous losses. It can be said that it is a "bottomless hole" for burning money.

Cumulative loss of about 12 billion yuan

The financial report shows that Ding Dong's total losses have a total loss of about 12 billion yuan (RMB, the same below). From 2019 to 2021, Ding Dong's net loss was 1.873 billion yuan, 3.177 billion yuan, and 6.43 billion yuan, respectively. On the evening of June 15th, Ding Dong's buying dishes released the first quarter of the 2022 financial report. The net loss during the reporting period was 477.4 million yuan. Compared with the same period of the same period last year, the loss of 1.3847 billion yuan narrowed significantly, and a good transcript was handed out.

However, does this mean that Ding Dong buys vegetables to grow better and will gradually achieve profitability? Some people in the industry believe that in the first half of this year, the epidemic in new crown pneumonia in Shanghai, Beijing and other places was repeated. Many consumers were limited by home isolation and home office. To a certain extent, it has promoted the rise in the order of fresh e -commerce platforms. However, whether this growth is sustainable still needs market inspection.

Ding Dong's financial report in the first quarter showed that its total revenue in the first quarter was 5.437 billion yuan, an increase of 43.2%over 3.802.1 billion yuan in the same period last year. Among them, the total operating cost and expenditure were 5.8923 billion yuan, an increase of 14.7%from 5.136 billion yuan in the same period last year. Performance expenditure was 1.4841 billion yuan; product research and development expenditure was 233.9 billion yuan, an increase of 49.5%year -on -year. From 2019 to 2021, Ding Dong's performance costs were 1.937 billion yuan, 4.044 billion yuan, and 7.278 billion yuan, respectively, totaling 13.259 billion yuan.

Some brokers analyzed that the profitability of the front warehouse model is difficult to cover the cost of performance. In the calculation formula of the front warehouse, the performance cost of the entire chain includes six items including warehouse rent, employee costs, distribution costs, logistics costs, depreciation costs, and water and electricity costs. The costs generated by the normal operation of the platform cannot be covered at all. According to the analysis of the research report of the Northeast Securities, the performance cost of the front warehouse model is as high as 10 yuan/single -13 yuan/single, which is about three times the traditional center's e -commerce company, about double the platform e -commerce, and the community group purchase of about six times Essence Taking Ding Dong's buying vegetables as an example, the cost of splitting costs, the performance cost (warehousing and logistics costs) is the largest expenditure item except product sales costs. Ding Dong buying vegetables in 2021. The proportion of storage and logistics expenses in business expenditure in business expenditure is close to 30 %, The proportion of revenue is close to 40%. From the perspective of growth, the increase in the performance of Ding Dong's performance in 2021 is far more than the growth rate of revenue expansion and sales cost of the same period.

In other words, on the basis of traditional e -commerce platforms such as burning money subsidies and marketing promotion, fresh e -commerce companies in the front position model need to invest more in performance costs to better improve consumer experience and win to win to win to win the winning consumer experience and win to win the winning. Big market share.

It is worth noting that if you still have money to buy vegetables? According to its financial report in the fourth quarter of 2021, Ding Dong's mobile assets bought vegetables were 6.516 billion yuan, but the mobile liabilities were as high as 7.348 billion yuan. Migrant assets could no longer cover mobile liabilities.

At the same time that the internal "hematopoietic" is insufficient, since the end of June 2021, it has not received external financing after going to the United States at the end of June 2021. As of the end of December 2021, Ding Dong's cash and cash equivalent and short -term investment were 5.23 billion yuan, of which 660 million yuan was reduced, the total amount decreased by about 1.6 billion yuan. Accounts payable and short -term borrowing of 3.1 billion yuan.

Facing the risk of delisting and delisting

Not only is the capital chain tightening, Ding Dong's buying vegetables also face the risk of delisting and delisting. On May 9, the US Securities and Exchange Commission announced the seventh batch of pre -delivery list of Chinese stocks, and Ding Dong was among them.

According to the practice, pre -delisting companies will be given a period of observation buffer period. During this period, the necessary documents and materials required by the US Securities and Exchange Commission will be submitted to the US Securities and Exchange Commission to prove that they do not need to be delisted. If you fail to submit a document within the time limit, enter the determined list and return the market from 2023 to early 2024.

Faced with the pressure of delisting, Ding Dong responded that the company has been actively exploring possible solutions to protect the interests of shareholders, and will continue to comply with relevant applicable laws and regulations to maintain the listing status of the NYSE.

However, in less than a year after listing, the stock price of Ding Dong's buying vegetables has fallen successively. The total market value has shrunk sharply from US $ 5.6 billion on the first day of listing to US $ 1.054 billion, and the market value has evaporated more than 80%. Another company, the performance of Daily Fresh in US stocks, is even more bleak. Its latest stock price is only 0.223 US dollars, a 98%plummeted from the issue price of $ 13.

Earlier, Hema CEO Hou Yi once posted a article bombarded Ding Dong to buy vegetables, saying that Ding Dong's buying food is estimated to be out of position immediately, relying on the investor's capital disorder expansion and price subsidies, it is not long to win the market.

"According to the current stock price performance of Ding Dong, it is difficult to achieve further financing through the secondary market. External blood transfusion is limited, cut off some cities with severe loss or poor profitability, and it is a self -rescue method for Ding Dong to buy vegetables. In fact, its operating problems have always existed, but in the past few years, due to the frequent financing of the industry, a large amount of capital hot money poured in, which made the track look very lively. With several front -site warehouse fresh e -commerce companies one after another successively continuously When listing, various data are more open and transparent, and more problems and contradictions will be exposed in the future. "Wen Zhihong said.

Some analysts believe that at present, the pre -warehouse fresh e -commerce still has room for survival in first -tier cities, especially in the prevention and control of the epidemic situation of individual cities. rise. However, for Ding Dong to buy food, the site layout of first -tier cities has tended to be saturated, and there is a ceiling in incremental users, and the market size of second- and third -tier and lower cities is very limited. Where can I find new growth space in the future? And how to rely on existing models to achieve continuous self -hematopoiesis? Obviously, there is not much time for Ding Dong to buy food.

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